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Abstract
This introduction describes what the co-editors believe readers can expect in this Special Issue.
After beliefs and expectancies are defined, examples of how these constructs influence human
thought, feeling, and behavior in legal settings are considered. Brief synopses are provided for the
Special Issue papers on beliefs and expectancies regarding alibis, children’s testimony behavior,
eyewitness testimony, confessions, sexual assault victims, judges’ decisions in child protection
cases, and attorneys’ beliefs about jurors’ perceptions of juvenile offender culpability. Areas for
future research are identified, and readers are encouraged to discover new ways that beliefs and
expectancies operate in the legal system.
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We are pleased to introduce this Special Issue of Psychology, Crime, & Law on beliefs and
expectancies in legal decision making. The catalyst for this collaboration was a series of
conference-situated musings between a social psychologist and cognitive psychologist about
two pillars of human behavior: beliefs and expectancies. Beliefs and expectancies are at
once both mundane and extraordinary. Mundane in the sense that they undergird all human
behavior; something each and every one of us experiences each and every day. Yet they are
equally, if not even more, extraordinary when we consider the far-reaching implications of
how they directly link to our thoughts, feelings, and actions. These attributes make a closer
examination of beliefs and expectancies worthwhile in any context, but particularly so
within the high-stakes arena of the legal system. Whether the decision maker is a police
officer assessing the truthfulness of an alibi, a juror evaluating the accuracy of an eyewitness
identification, an attorney arguing a case involving a juvenile offender, or a judge deciding
whether to terminate parental rights—these decisions matter and without doubt are
influenced by beliefs and expectancies.
The purpose of this Introduction is to inform readers what we believe they should expect in
the Special Issue. We begin by defining what we mean by beliefs and expectancies and then
consider some of the ways these constructs influence our thoughts, feelings, and behavior in
legal settings. Next, we provide brief synopses of the articles contained herein and conclude
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by encouraging readers to investigate exciting new ways that beliefs and expectancies shape
legal decision making.
Beliefs and expectancies defined
It is only fitting that we begin by defining what we mean by beliefs and expectancies.
Beliefs are bits of information or knowledge that are subjectively accepted as true and often
involve links between an object/target and an attribute (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). We form
beliefs primarily based on personal experience and communication with other people. One
might believe, for example, that this year’s Nebraska Cornhuskers are the greatest college
football team ever or that the goldenrod is the prettiest flower on earth. Here we see
particular objects (a football team and a flower) linked to specific attributes (athletic
prowess and beauty). Note that although the attributes listed here are positive, they need not
necessarily be (football teams can be bad and flowers can be ugly). Valence aside, the key
for a belief is that the information or link is thought to be true—whether or not it factually is
true—and, as such, serves as a springboard for expectancies.
Expectancies are beliefs about a future state of affairs (Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996). They
entail subjective estimates of likelihood, ranging from a mere possibility to a virtual
certainty (Roese & Sherman, 2007). The relative certainty and valence of expectancies can
vary based on individual and situational factors. Returning to our previous example, one’s
belief about the athletic prowess of the Cornhuskers may lead a person to expect the team
will likely win its football game this weekend, just as one’s belief about the beauty of
goldenrods may lead a person to expect that if he gives a goldenrod bouquet to his
sweetheart, she probably will be delighted. Although these examples refer to explicit or
conscious expectancies, implicit expectancies operate in our daily lives as well. For instance,
I turn the key in my car ignition every day expecting the engine to start without explicitly
thinking about this outcome. As simple as these examples might appear, we hope they make
the following points clear: (1) not all beliefs are expectancies; (2) expectancies are
predicated on beliefs (‘My belief about X leads me to expect Y’); (3) expectancies are
future-oriented; and (4) some expectancies are more factually accurate than others.
Beliefs and expectancies in legal decision making
Much can and has been said about how beliefs and expectancies influence our everyday
thoughts, feelings, and actions (see Miller & Turnbull, 1986, for a review). We have chosen
to narrow the focus for the Special Issue by examining how these constructs operate within
the legal system. Beliefs and expectancies affect how we think by guiding what we attend to,
encode, and remember in the world around us (Roese & Sherman, 2007). We actively tend
to seek out information that confirms (rather than disconfirms) our pre-existing beliefs and
expectancies (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Social and cognitive psychologists refer to this
tendency as a ‘confirmation bias’, and applied psychologists have repackaged it as
‘experimenter bias’, ‘investigator bias’, and ‘interviewer bias’. The gist of this concept is
captured by the colloquialisms ‘Seek and ye shall find’ and ‘What we see is what we
expect’. Whether actors are fans from rival athletic teams (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954),
students evaluating a professor (Kelley, 1950), bystanders witnessing an ambiguous shove
(Duncan, 1976), or an experimenter testing a hypothesis (Rosenthal, 1976), people tend to
interpret information in line with their previously held beliefs and expectancies. This
tendency has direct implications for anyone involved in the legal system. A police officer’s
determination of a suspect’s truthfulness, a forensic examiner’s evaluation of a defendant’s
competency, or a juror’s assessment of a witness’s credibility, are but a few examples of
how beliefs and expectancies impact legal outcomes. Suspects may be released or detained,
defendants may be tried or committed, and witnesses may be believed or discarded in a
McAuliff and Bornstein Page 2













biased fashion. According to this perspective, knowing a person’s beliefs or expectancies
should provide valuable information when attempting to predict or understand legal decision
making.
Beliefs and expectancies guide our behavior in addition to influencing how we think. Of
particular concern is that we tend to behave in ways that elicit the outcomes we expect.
Psychologists have used various labels to describe this phenomenon, such as ‘expectancy
effects’, ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, and ‘behavioral confirmation’. The behaviors involved
can vary along several dimensions. They may be verbal or nonverbal, deliberate or
unintentional, and positive or negative. They may exert influence alone or in concert with
one another. Early research by Rosenthal and his colleagues documented expectancy effects
in classroom and laboratory settings. Elementary students randomly labeled as ‘bloomers’
and rats randomly labeled as ‘maze smart’ outperformed their counterparts when teachers
and experimenters were told these labels in advance (Rosenthal, 1976; Rosenthal &
Jacobson, 1968). In essence, the labels caused teachers/experimenters to behave in ways that
facilitated outcomes consistent with their beliefs and expectancies (i.e., better grades and
faster maze times).
Similar findings have emerged on tasks more directly related to the legal system such as
eyewitness lineup identifications and suspect interrogations. In fact, one could argue that
expectancy effects are even more likely to occur in this setting, given the significance of the
decisions being made (crime investigation, determination of guilt/innocence, terminating
parental rights, sentencing) and the firmly-held convictions of the parties involved (police
officers, corrections officers, forensic interviewers, experts, judges, and attorneys).
Investigator bias can arise in eyewitness identification lineups when the lineup administrator
knows the identity of the suspect (who may or may not be the actual perpetrator). Compared
to double-blind lineups in which neither the administrator nor the eyewitness knows the
suspect’s identity, single-blind lineups in which the administrator knows the suspect’s
identity result in higher identification rates of the suspect (Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Haw
& Fisher, 2004; Phillips, McAuliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999), higher levels of eyewitness
confidence in the identification decision (Garrioch & Brimacombe, 2001), and differences in
the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the lineup administrator (Greathouse & Kovera, 2009).
Even more troubling, eyewitnesses and lineup administrators report few if any differences in
administrator influence as a function of the single- versus double-blind procedure
(Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Phillips et al., 1999). Either they are unaware of the bias or
simply refuse to report it.
Researchers studying interrogations and confessions have found that interrogators who are
led to believe the suspect is guilty tend to ask more guilt-presumptive questions, use tougher
interrogation tactics, and exert more pressure on suspects to get a confession than those who
are led to believe the suspect is innocent (Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003).
Interestingly, the effect of this interrogator bias is not the same for suspects who are truly
guilty versus truly innocent; the bias increases the likelihood of confessions by innocent
suspects, but has no effect on the likelihood of confessions from guilty suspects (Narchet,
Meissner, & Russano, 2011). Breaking this process down, we can see that an innocent
suspect is more likely to confess when the interrogator believes the suspect is guilty because
this belief leads the interrogator to behave differently during the interrogation, which in turn
elicits behavior from the suspect (a confession) that confirms the interrogator’s initial (and
in this case, incorrect) belief.
Why do beliefs and expectancies exert such a strong influence on the behavior of others?
One potential mechanism is demand characteristics, which refer to the totality of cues
present in a situation that convey the expected or desired outcome to an individual (Orne,
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1962). Whereas expectancy effects are rooted in the motives of the actor, demand
characteristics depend on the perceptions of the individual in the situation with the actor.
Wells and Luus (1990) extended Orne’s original work on demand characteristics in
psychological experiments to eyewitness identification lineups by likening an investigator to
an experimenter and an eyewitness to a participant. Much like participants in experiments
want to provide the experimenter ‘good data’, witnesses are motivated to do the same for
investigators for several reasons.
One reason is altruism, which motivates people to do what they believe is good or right in a
given situation. Just as a participant wants to contribute to a successful experiment by
confirming the experimenter’s hypothesis, so too does a victim or witness during a lineup/
interview want to help by providing whatever information is expected by the investigator.
This information may consist of details about an alleged crime or the identification of a
suspect from a photo lineup. Child witnesses are particularly susceptible to subtle (and
sometimes not-so-subtle) expectancies conveyed by the interviewer as to what the ‘right’
answer is, leading them, for example, to be more likely to change their answer when asked
the same question multiple times (e.g., Ceci & Friedman, 2000).
Evaluation apprehension is a second reason why participants are sensitive to demand
characteristics in experiments and other situations (Orne, 1962). We seek to generate
favorable impressions of ourselves in others, and one way to do so is to comply with the
perceived goals or expectancies of others in a situation. In experiments, participants desire to
win the approval of the experimenter and attempt to maximize the positive aspects of their
evaluation while minimizing any negative aspects (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). Victims
and witnesses may behave similarly in legal contexts. Evaluation apprehension may be
reflected in the tendency of inaccurate eyewitnesses to provide more detailed explanations
of their identification process (‘I compared the photos to each other to narrow the choices’)
than accurate eyewitnesses (Dunning & Stern, 1994). Essentially, they want to appear like a
‘good eyewitness’ to gain the approval of the investigator. The need for positive evaluation
also might help explain why affirming post-identification feedback from an investigator
(e.g., ‘Good, you identified the suspect’) causes eyewitnesses to overestimate the positive
aspects of the witnessing experience, including their certainty, quality of view, clarity of
memory, and attention during the event (Wells & Bradfield, 1998).
Obedience to authority is a third reason why people are motivated to comply with demand
characteristics. In a psychological experiment, this refers to participants’ desire to do what is
asked of them because they see the experimenter as an authority figure who should be
obeyed (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). A classic example of this phenomenon is Milgram’s
(1963) study of obedience to authority in which participants were willing to administer
dangerously high levels of an electrical shock to another person simply because the
experimenter encouraged them to do so. High stress and situation unfamiliarity may
exacerbate deference to authority figures as well—attributes that some would argue
characterize any interaction with law enforcement or other members of the legal system.
Like experimenters, legal professionals must be cognizant of and vigilant against the
influence of demand characteristics arising from altruism, evaluation apprehension, and
obedience to authority.
Finally, much like beliefs and expectancies influence our thoughts and behavior, they affect
our feelings as well. We react negatively to information that disconfirms our pre-existing
beliefs and expectancies (Olson et al., 1996). Some researchers have argued that this
negative affective state is caused by the disruption of processing fluency (Winkielman &
Cacioppo, 2001). In other words, we do not like having to expend the additional cognitive
resources required to reconcile disconfirming information or experiences. Another possible
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explanation involves the false consensus effect, which states that we tend to overestimate the
degree to which others agree with us (Marks & Miller, 1987). If false consensus is
psychologically comforting and self-validating, then the exact opposite may be true when
we realize that others do not share our beliefs or expectancies. Simply put, disconfirming
evidence yields an unpleasant, negative affective state that we seek to reduce, eliminate, or
avoid altogether. The emotional effects of expectancy confirmation or disconfirmation are
especially relevant for jurors evaluating witness behavior in court (Bornstein & Greene,
2011), but we can see how they might affect other actors in the legal system too. For
example, imagine a forensic interviewer who believes a child was sexually abused based on
information provided by a school counselor. She might experience frustration or other
negative emotions if the child provides information that is inconsistent with what she
believes happened. This negative emotional reaction could bleed into her verbal and
nonverbal behavior (how she asks questions/responds to answers), which in turn could
influence the child’s responses as a function of demand characteristics. The end result could
be a child alleging abuse that did not occur.
To summarize, beliefs and expectancies influence how we think, feel, and behave in
essentially all situations, not excepting those presumed to be purely objective and
dispassionate, such as legal contexts (Bornstein & Wiener, 2010). In the next section, we
provide brief synopses of the papers selected for this Special Issue. Our goals in putting
together the Special Issue were twofold: to include research that was novel both in content
and approach, and to advance our understanding of beliefs and expectancies in legal
decision making.
The Special Issue: a sneak peek
We open with a paper on alibis by Jennifer Dysart and Deryn Strange. Alibi evidence has
received increased attention from legal scholars and social scientists in the wake of recent
Innocence Project DNA exonerations—some of which involved shaky or nonexistent alibis
—and the publication of an alibi typology by Olsen and Wells (2004). Most research to date
has focused on jurors’ perceptions of alibi believability, yet law enforcement officers and
prosecutors must make critical decisions about alibi believability before charging an
individual with a crime and proceeding to trial. In their paper for this Special Issue, Dysart
and Strange sought to fill this void in the literature by surveying US and Canadian senior
law enforcement personnel about their beliefs and experiences involving alibi evidence.
Overall, respondents were quite skeptical of alibis, but they believed that investigating alibis
sooner rather than later increases their utility in determining a suspect’s potential criminal
involvement. The most believable alibi stories include physical evidence or a statement from
an unmotivated other, but those occur only in a minority of cases. These survey findings
shed light on an important, but heretofore overlooked, population with respect to alibi
evidence. Whether prosecutors and, ultimately, jurors share similar beliefs and concerns
about alibis remains an unanswered research question ripe for investigation.
Many states have introduced evidentiary and procedural innovations to help facilitate
children’s testimony in abuse cases. Certain innovations, such as closed-circuit television
(CCTV) testimony, reduce children’s stress and increase their accuracy; however, jurors
tend to evaluate children who use CCTV more negatively on a variety of credibility-related
dimensions (Goodman, Tobey, Batterman-Faunce, Orcutt, Thomas, Shapiro, et al., 1998).
To better understand this vexing issue, McAuliff and Kovera’s paper describes results from
a survey in which prospective jurors listed their expectancies for a child’s verbal and
nonverbal behavior across five different testimony conditions (traditional versus several
alternative forms of testimony), as well as their beliefs about discerning children’s
truthfulness, testimony stress, and fairness to trial parties. Prospective jurors expected a
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child providing traditional testimony to be more nervous, tearful, and fidgety; less confident,
cooperative, and fluent; and to maintain less eye contact and provide shorter responses than
when the child provided alternative forms of testimony. They also believed it was easiest to
determine a child’s truthfulness and fairest to the defendant when the child testified live in
court, but that this form of testimony was the most stressful and unfair to the child. If
accommodated children remain nervous (and data from actual trials suggest this is so), they
may fail to meet jurors’ expectancies and be viewed more negatively as a result. Future
research that systematically varies the presence or absence of children’s expected behaviors
is needed to determine how jurors react to expectancy violation, as well as the potential role
of legal safeguards in reducing any unintended negative effects.
Eyewitness testimony can be extremely compelling yet imperfect trial evidence. Effectively
evaluating such testimony requires that jurors know what factors influence eyewitness
accuracy, identify those factors (when present) in a case, and weigh their potential impact on
the eyewitness’s memory accordingly. This is no small feat, and previous research has
shown that laypeople’s beliefs about factors that influence eyewitness accuracy are often
incorrect (e.g., Boyce, Beaudry, & Lindsay, 2007). Neal, Christiansen, Bornstein, and
Robicheaux expand this body of research in two studies examining mock jurors’ beliefs
about the effects of eyewitness age, weapon presence, and identification decision time on
eyewitness accuracy and whether those beliefs predict trial-related decisions. Neal and her
colleagues systemically manipulated eyewitness age, weapon presence, and identification
decision time in different versions of a robbery-murder case and observed that, to some
extent, participants’ beliefs about these factors interacted with the manipulations to affect
mock jurors’ judgments. These findings highlight the continued need for expert testimony
on factors that influence eyewitness accuracy. Voir dire surveys that target beliefs about
specific factors such as eyewitness age and weapon presence, instead of more general beliefs
about eyewitness accuracy, might also be useful to attorneys when selecting a jury in cases
involving eyewitness evidence.
Much like alibi and eyewitness evidence, research on confessions has gained considerable
momentum in the wake of recent DNA exonerations (for a review, see Kassin, Drizin,
Grisso, Gudjonsson, Leo, & Redlich, 2010). Horgan, Russano, Meissner, and Evans present
research on the diagnostic value of confessions (i.e., the ratio of true to false confessions
elicited) obtained using common minimization (i.e., expectation of leniency) and
maximization (i.e., threat of harsher punishment) tactics. The authors used pilot data to
identify minimization and maximization tactics believed to influence (or not influence) the
expected consequences of confessing and then varied these tactics in a written description of
the Russano, Meissner, Narchet, and Kassin (2005) paradigm. Participants were sensitive to
the use of manipulative techniques in the interrogation descriptions and believed that such
techniques could lead other people (but notably, not themselves) to confess falsely.
However, when participants actually engaged in the Russano et al. interrogation paradigm in
Study 2, they were vulnerable to the manipulation of consequences and were more likely to
provide a false confession as a result. Horgan and her colleagues argue that even though the
minimization and maximization tactics used in their studies are technically legal, they might
undermine the goal of eliciting true confessions and place innocent suspects at greater risk.
Sexual assault cases often lack corroborative evidence, requiring jurors to discern between
two dramatically conflicting accounts from the alleged victim and perpetrator. Judgments of
credibility are paramount in this process and draw on laypeople’s expectancies for how
witnesses should behave while testifying. Researchers have studied the type of emotional
reactions decision makers expect from victims, but less is known about the expected
consistency of those emotional reactions over time. Klippenstine and Schuller address this
lingering issue using a written trial simulation in which they orthogonally manipulated a
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victim’s response (tearful/upset versus calm/controlled) both the day following the alleged
sexual assault and then again during her trial testimony. Quite interestingly, mock jurors
were more supportive of the victim and less supportive of the accused on multiple measures
when the victim’s response was consistent over time, irrespective of whether that response
was tearful/upset or calm/controlled. These findings raise concern for how a victim who
improves her ability to cope over time (perhaps through counseling) may be disadvantaged
in the eyes of jurors, given their expectancies for emotional consistency over time.
In cases of substantiated abuse or neglect, children often are removed from the home and
placed in foster care. Child protection court judges must make crucial decisions involving
the permanency plan for each child. A key consideration in this process is the perceived risk
of the child’s returning home versus remaining in foster care. Little is known regarding how
judges actually determine perceived risk and what information factors into their
determinations. For their contribution to this Special Issue, Summers, Gatowsky, and
Dobbin surveyed child protection court judges to examine the influence of experience,
expectancy-related case information, and other individual factors on their risk perceptions in
a simulated termination of parental rights case. Three expectancy-related case factors varied
across different versions of the case materials: sibling presence, parental involvement in a
support group, and statistical information regarding the child’s adoptability. Experienced
judges’ perceptions of risk were predicted by sibling presence and parental support group
involvement, whereas less experienced judges’ perceptions were predicted by adoptability
statistics and individual factors including negative emotion, cognitive style, and age.
Summers and her colleagues argue that less experienced judges may not be adequately
equipped to recognize factors relevant to risk perceptions and that increased judicial
rotations are necessary to improve judges’ understanding of child abuse and neglect cases.
In the final article, Camilletti and Scullin present a survey of attorneys and college students
on factors believed to influence jurors’ perceptions of juvenile offender culpability. The two
samples disagreed about the potential influence of certain factors such as abuse history, race/
ethnicity, and poor quality of area schools, but agreed that a juvenile offender’s youthful
appearance would mitigate his perceived culpability and that juvenile crime trend
information would have no effect. Contrary to those beliefs, a follow-up simulation study
that manipulated both variables revealed that only juvenile crime trend information affected
mock jurors’ decisions. These data remind us that what attorneys believe are important
mitigating factors for their juvenile clients may or may not correspond with jurors’ actual
beliefs and decisions in juvenile cases. Defense and prosecuting attorneys would benefit by
targeting jurors’ beliefs about juvenile crime trends during voir dire in cases involving
juvenile offenders.
Conclusions
We hope readers will enjoy the Special Issue and close by encouraging them to consider
novel applications of beliefs and expectancies to the legal system. Given the ubiquitous
nature of these constructs, there is no shortage of research to be done. Some understudied
areas that appear particularly well-suited for examination include jury decision making in
civil cases (e.g., expectancies about a ‘reasonable’ damages award), determinations of
probation and parole made within the corrections system, the evaluation and interpretation
of forensic evidence (e.g., handwriting, fingerprint, accident reconstruction, and tool mark
analysis), attorney indoctrination of jurors during voir dire, and the role of unintentional
adversarial allegiance in expert testimony, just to name a few. We look forward to revisiting
the topic 10 years from now and pointing to all the great research that has been done—you
might even say we expect it.
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